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ADVANCEMENTS: II*

Harold I. Elbertt

VI
REQUISITES OF ADVANCEMENTS

A

inter vivos transfer by a parent to a child is not an
advancement so long as the transferor lives. The purpose of the
doctrine is to equalize an intestate's property among his children. It
is auxiliary to the distribution of his estate that the question of advancement is raised. 220 The death of the transferor is not enough to give
rise to the doctrine. The person seeking to charge the intestate's
heirs with an advancement must prove several additional facts. The
legislation of each state determines what must be proved in order to
charge the transferee with an advancement.
VOLUNT.ARY

A.

Intent of the Advancor

A parent or grandparent may transfer property during his lifetime to a child or grandchild. On his death intestate the courts are
often called upon to determine whether the transaction was a gift, a
resulting trust or an advancement. In all states except Kentucky and
South Carolina, the rule is that the intent of the advancor at the time
of the transaction is the determining factor in ascertaining whether
a transfer is or is not an advancement.221
* A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the School of Law of the University of
Michigan in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the S.J.D. degree. Part I was
published in March 1953, Vol. 51, pp. 665-704.
t Member, Missouri and Oklahoma Bars.-Ed.
220 Harper v. Harris, (8th Cir. 1923) 294 F. 44.
221 Booth v. Foster, 111 Ala. 312, 20 S. 356 (1895); Fennell v. Henry, 70 Ala. 484
(1881); Holland v. Bonner, 142 Ark. 214, 218 S.W. 665 (1920); In re Guardianship
of Hudelson, (Cal. App. 1941) 109 P. (2d) 964; Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059
(1927); Barron v. Barron, 181 Ga. 505, 182 S.E. 851 (1935); Parker v. Parker, 147 Ga.
432, 94 S.E. 543 (1917); Andrews v. Halliday, 63 Ga. 263 (1879). In that case the
intestate thought that he had advanced each of his children an equal amount, but in fact
some had received more than others. The court ruled that the mere fact he thought he
had advanced his children equal amounts did not relieve them from accounting for advancements. The court said, at 269-270: "If the advancements were really unequal, that
the intestate was under a misapprehension as to their equality would not make the least
difference. Why should it? The scheme of the law is for each distributee to account for
what he actually got by way of advancement, not for what the ancestor may have supposed
he got. And this does not interfere with the right of the latter to put a valuation upon
property where he has undertaken to do so. The two questions are altogether different."
Johnson v. Belden, 20 Conn. 322 (1850); Meeker v. Meeker, 16 Conn. 383 (1844); Culp
v. Wilson, 133 Ind. 294, 32 N.E. 928 (1893); Dille v. Webb, 61 Ind. 85 (1878); Duling
v. Johnson, 32 Ind. 155 (1869); In re Sell's Estate, 197 Iowa 696, 197 N.W. 922 (1924);
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In England, since passage of the Administration of Estates Act of
1925, the intent of the advancor is determinative.222 · However, an
analysis of the English cases decided prior to that date casts a great
deal of doubt on the role that the intent of the advancor played in
determining whether or not a voluntary inter vivas transfer of property was an advancement. In no English case was the court called
upon to determine the intent of the advancor. The cases never speak
of his intent nor of the intent of the advancee. However, opinions by
well known English jurists tend to indicate that the intent of the advancor was regarded as immaterial. In Edwards v. Freeman, 223 Lord
Chief Justice Raymond, in commenting on the advancement provision
of the statute of distributions, said:
"But then the act takes it into consideration, that there may
be some of the children who have received a portion or advancement before, but not so much as to make up their full share; in
that case such child so advanced but in part, shall have so much
more out of the intestate's personal estate as will suffice to make
his share equal to that of the other children. The statute takes
nothing away that has been given to any of the children, however
unequal they may have been, how much soever that may exceed
Ellis v. Newell, 120 Iowa 71, 94 N.W. 463 (1903); Bash v. Bash, 182 Iowa 55, 165
N.W. 399 (1917); McCabe v. Broeme, 107 Md. 490, 69 A. 259 (1908); Clark v. Willson,
27 Md. 693 (1867); Parks v. Parks, 19 Md. 323 (1863); Garrett v. Colvin, 77 Miss. 408,
26 S. 963 (1899); Schlicher v. Keeler, (N.J. Ch. 1905) 62 A. 4; Wolfe v. Galloway,
211 N.C. 361, 190 S.E. 213 (1937); Nobles v. Davenport, 185 S.C. 162, 116 S.E. 407
(1923); Thompson v. Smith, 160 N.C. 256, 75 S.E. 1010 (1911); Kiger v. Terry, 119
N.C. 456, 26 S.E. 38 (1896); O'Connor v. Flick, 271 Pa. 249, 114 A. 636 (1921); In
re Brahm's Estate, 269 Pa. 82, 112 A. 21 (1920); Johnson v. Patterson, 81 Tenn. (13
Lea) 626 (1884); Morris v. Morris, 56 Tenn. (9 Heisk.) (1872). In that case the court
said, at 816: ''The provision in Section 2431 of the Code, that 'Absolute equality shall
be observed in the division of estates of deceased persons, except where a will has been
made and its provisions render equality impossible,' is a mere announcement of a rule of
law of effective existence without the Statute; and was expressed by the Legislature with
a view to the estate owned by the deceased at the moment of his death, and upon the
idea that no advancements had been made by him in his lifetime. It was not intended to
restrict or enlarge the general rule upon the subject of advancements. • • ." Rowe v. Rowe,
144 Va. 816, 130 S.E. 771 (1925); McClanahan v. McClanahan, 36 W.Va. 34, H S.E.
419 (1892). Since the doctrine depends on the intent of the intestate, the courts hold that
an insane person is incapable of making an advancement. In re Guardianship of Hudelson,
supra this note; In re Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 234 (1940). In
that case sisters of an incompetent petitioned the probate court for an allowance of support
out of his estate. The court made them an allowance and decreed that the amount so
received should be charged as an advancement. Insofar as the technical doctrine of advancements is concerned that decision is clearly erroneous. The doctrine is not applicable
where the parties concerned are brothers and sisters. In addition, the advancor was incapable of exercising the required intent. Perhaps the decision can be justified as an
advance.
22215 Geo. V, c. 23, §47(I)(iii) (1925).
223 2 P. Wms. 436, 24 Eng. Rep. 803 at 806 (1727).
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the remainder of the personal estate left by the intestate at his
death, the child may, if he pleases, keep it all; if he be not contented, but would have more, then he must bring into hotchpot
what he has before received; this manifestly seems to be the intention of the act, grounded upon the most just rule of equity,
equality."
In Edwards 11. Freeman, Lord Chief Justice Raymond also said:
"... the statute of distribution does not break into any settlement
that has been made by the father; it only meddles with what is
left undisposed of by him, and of that only makes such a will for
the intestate, as a father, free from the partiality of affections,
would himself make; and this I may call a parliamentary will."

In Blackley 11. Blockley,224 Judge Pearson said:
"I think the intention of the statute was not to disturb anything which had been done by the intestate in his lifetime, but
that that which had been done should be taken into account in
estimating his children's shares of his estate. That makes the
whole of such a transaction between father and son fair. If the
father makes a will, saying that he wishes the son to have what he
has given him in his lifetime over and above what he has given
him by his will, the son will take it. But if the father dies intestate, the law says, the right rule between children is equality,
and, so far as is possible, there should be equality among the children."
Because either there was doubt as to whether the intent of the
advancor determined the nature of a voluntary inter vivos transfer or
because the consensus among English lawyers was that the intent of
the advancor was immaterial, Parliament decided that a clarification
or change of law was necessary and consequently enacted as a part
of the Administration of Estates Act of 1925 the following provision:
"... then any money or property which, by way of advancement
or on marriage of a child of the intestate, has been paid to such
child by the intestate or settled by the intestate for the benefit of
such child (including any life or less interest and including property covenanted to be paid or settled) shall, subject to any contrary
intention expressed or appearing from the circumstances of the
case, be taken as being so paid or settled in or towards satisfaction
of the share of such child or the share which such child would
have taken if living at the death of the intestate...."225
224 29
22s 15

Ch. Div. 250 at 253 (1885). Cf. Taylor
Geo. V., c. 23, §47l(iii) (1925).

v.

Taylor, L.R. 20 Eq. 155 (1875).
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Although the English statute of distributions is the prototype of
most American statutes, American courts had no difficulty in determining that the intent of the advancor determines whether a voluntary inter vivos tr~sfer is an advancement. South Carolina is the
only state in which an American court, construing an advancement
statute similar to the statute of distributions, held that the intent of
the advancor was i~material.226 A perusal of the American decisions
indicates that some courts do not correctly interpret the English cases.
For instance, the Kentucky court in Barber v. Taylor's Heirs, 221 cites
Edwards v. Freeman as authority for the rule that the intent of the
advancor controls. In Graves v. Spedden,228 the Maryland court,
without citing any English authority, stated that in Maryland, as in
England, the intention of the intestate determines whether or not a
gift of property is an advancement. In Mitchell's Distributees v.
Mitchell's Admrs.,229 the Alabama court stated that the law of advancements was based on the custom of London. The court pointed out
that under the custom the intent of the advancor controlled. Since
it is doubtful whether the English statute of distributions is based on
the custom, the decision of the Alabama court seems unsound. 230
Most cases do not rely on any authority but merely assume that
an advancement depends on the intent of the advancor. Some decisions reach the same conclusions on the theory that a person has the
absolute right to dispose of his property as he pleases, and therefore,
the intent of the transferor determines the nature of the transaction. 231
This proposition was well expressed by the North Carolina court in
the case of James v. James2 32 as follows:
" 'A man has a right to do with his own property as he chooses,'
is a proposition agreed to on all hands. The restriction is, he shall
not interfere with the rights of other persons which are recognized
either at law or in equity; hence he is not at liberty either by sale
or gift to dispose of property to which another person is entitled
by mortgage or deed or trust, nor is he at liberty to dispose of his
property by gift in respect to his creditors unless he retains property amply sufficient to pay his debts.
"A child is not a creditor of his father and has no right to
226 Heyward v. Middleton, 65 S.C. 493, 43 S.E. 956 (1903); Rees v. Rees, 11 Rich.
Eq. (S.C.) 86 (1859); M'Caw v. Blewit, 2 McCord Eq. (S.C.) 90 (1827).
221 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 84 (1839).
22s 46 Md. 527 (1877).
220 8 Ala. 414 (1845).
230 See fust instalment of this article, 51 lvI:rCH. L. Rsv. 665 at 672-673 (1953).
231Holland v. Bonner, 142 Ark. 214, 218 S.W. 665 (1920).
232 76 N.C. 331 at 332 (1887).
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object, either in law or in equity, to the father's right of disposition.
The child has a mere 'expectancy.'"

In a few cases the courts have reached the same result by referring
to the advancement statute. For example, in Kiger 11. T erry,2 33 the
North Carolina court pointed out that in a few states the intent of the
parent was excluded by statute and in those states all transfers by him
are advancements. The court then pointed out that their statute did
not expressly exclude the parent's intent. Using these statements as
a basis for its decision, the court said that the statute left in force the
evident rule"... that the owner of property may dispose of it according to his own desire...."
In Indiana, the statutes read in part as follows: "Advancements
in real or personal property shall be charged against the child to whom
the advancement is made . . . but if the advancement exceed the
equal proportion of the child advanced, the excess shall not be refunded."234
"The maintaining, or educating or giving money to a child, without a view toward a portion or settlement in life, shall not be deemed
an advancement."235 In construing that statute, the Indiana court
ruled that the question of whether a transfer of property is an advancement or gift depends on the intent of the advancor or donor. As a
basis for this decision the court pointed out that the first part of the
statute does not define advancement, and the latter provision merely
declares what is not an advancement. Therefore, since intent determines what is not an advancement under some circumstances, all advancements must depend on the intent of the advancor. 236
Some courts have reached the conclusion that an advancement
depends on the intent of the advancor by relying on cases where the
question to be determined was whether the transfer was a gift or resulting trust. 237 In Jackson 11. Matsdorf, 238 a parent transferred title
to property to his daughter in order to avoid claims of creditors. Later,
he sought to compel her to reconvey the property on the theory that
the transfer was a resulting trust. The court ruled that the parent's
intent at the time of the transfer determined whether the transfer was
119 N.C. 456, 26 S.E. 38 (1896).
Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) §6-2354.
235 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) §1504.
236 Woolery v. Woolery, 29 Ind. 249 (1868).
237 Culp v. Price, 107 Iowa 133, 77 N.W. 848 (1899); Herbert v. Alvord, 75 N.J.
Eq. 428, 72 A. 946 (1909); Jackson v. Matsdorf, 11 Johns. (N.Y.) 91 (1814); Burbeck
v. Spollen, 6 Ohio Dec. 1118, 10 Am. Law Rec. 491 (1882).
2as 11 Johns. (N.Y.) 91 (1814).
233

234 Ind.
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an advancement or resulting trust. Of course, the use of the word
"advancement" was inaccurate because a transfer is never an advancement until after the death of the advancor. In Burheck v. Spollen,239
the Ohio court, when called upon to determine whether a transfer was
a gift or advancement, erroneously relied on the case of Jackson v.
Matsdorf for authority for the proposition that advancement depends
on the intent of the advancor.
In some states, by statute, a gift or grant of property is not an
advancement unless it is expressed in the grant to be so made or
charged in writing by the intestate or acknowledged in writing as such
by the child. Courts, in interpreting that legislation, state that the
statute does not change the rule that the intent of the advancor determines whether a transaction is a gift or advancement. Such a rule
merely prescribes the manner by which the intention shall be proved.240

I. The Kentucky Rule. The previous Kentucky statute on ad- ·
vancements reads in part as follows: ". . . where any children of
the intestate . . . shall have received from the intestate in his lifetime any real estate by way of advancement, . . . such advancement
shall be brought into hotchpot with the estate descended." 241 Under
that statute the Kentucky court held that the intent of the advancor
or donor determined whether the transaction was an advancement or
gift.242 The present Kentucky statute reads in part as follows: "Any
real or personal property or money, given or devised by a parent or
grandparent to a descendant, shall be charged to the descendant. 243
An analysis of this statute shows that the intent of the advancor is
immaterial.244 The statute also provides that "the maintaining, or
educating or the giving of money to a child or grandchild without any
view to a portion or settlement in life, shall not be deemed an advancement." Under that proviso of the statute, the intent of the advancor
or donor is determinative.245
239 6 Ohio Dec. lll8, 10 Am. Law Rec. 491 (1882).
240Elliott v. Western Coal and Mining Co., 243 ill. 614, 90 N.E. ll04 (1910);
Comer v. Comer, 119 ill. 170, 8 N.E. 796 (1886). In that case the court pointed out that
prior to the act requiring advancements to be charged in writing all substantial gifts were
presumed to be advancements. Since the enactment of the statute, there is no such presumption unless the evidence of the advancement is written. Fellows v. Little, 46 N.H.
27 (1865).
241Ky. Stat. (1792-1834) tit. 61, §15 and tit. 75, §28.
242 Barber v. Taylor's Heirs, 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 84 (1839).
24s Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140.
244 Gossage v. Gossage's Admr., 281 Ky. 575, 136 S.W. (2d) 775 (1940); Ecton v.
Flynn, 229 Ky. 476, 17 S.W. (2d) 407 (1929); Boblett v. Barlow, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1076,
83 S.W. 145 (1904); Bowles v. Winchester, 76 Ky. (13 Bush.) 1 (1877).
245 Crain v. Mallone, 130 Ky. 125, ll3 S.W. 67 (1908); Hill's Guardian v. Hill,
122 Ky. 681, 92 S.W. 924 (1906).
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In that state, a person who has made a gift of property to a descendant and does not want it charged as an advancement can defeat
the statute in three ways: (I) by disposing of all his property by will,
(2) by giving all his property away before his death, or (3) by
advancements to a descendant which exceed his share of the estate.246
In all other states he can defeat the statute in these ways and, with the
exception of South Carolina, by declaring that the transfer is an absolute gift. In South Carolina, since the intent of the transferor is
regarded as immaterial, he cannot defeat the statute by declaring that
a voluntary inter vivos transfer of property is an absolute gift. In all
states, except those that hold the doctrine of advancements applicable
to cases of partial intestacy, a person can defeat the doctrine if he dies
intestate as to part of his property.

B. Acceptance
Most courts which hold that the intent of the advancor determines
whether a voluntary inter vivas transfer of property from a parent to
a child is an advancement, hold that the intent of the advancee or
transferee is immaterial. These same states also hold that a voluntary
inter vivas transfer by a parent to a child is prima facie an advancement. Likewise, they hold that an instruction which reads " . . .
·advancements must not only have been intended by the parent as. an
advancement, but must also have been accepted by the child as an
advancement," is erroneous. It is not necessary for the parent to say
to the child: "Now I give you this as an advancement," and the child
to respond: "I accept it as such." All that is required to show acceptance is for the child to receive the money or property and in that sense
accept it.247 Such a rule, although consistent with the rule that an
246 Cleaver v. Kirk's "Heirs, 60 Ky. (3 Mete.) 270 (1860). Cf. Sullivan v. Sullivan,
29 Ky. L. Rep. 239 (1906).
247 Ireland v. Dyer, 133 Ga. 851, 67 S.E. 195 (1910); Holliday v. Wingfield, 59 Ga.
206 (1877). Cf. Sherwood v. Smith, 23 Conn. *516 (1855). In that case the court
said at 521: "A son might be willing to receive property as a gift, which he would prefer
not to take, as a part of his portion in his father's estate. He might be willing to receive
a collegiate education, if the expenses were borne as a gift, when, if they were to be
charged to him as an advancement, he might prefer having the amount in a different form."
Cf. Davis v. Garrett, 91 Tenn. (7 Pickle) 147, 18 S.W. 113 (1892). In that case a
father conveyed a slave to his seven-year-old daughter. He registered the title as required
by law. It was held that the transaction was an advancement. Since the conveyance was
beneficial to the daughter, the court presumed that she accepted it. Rains v. Hays, 74
Tenn. (6 Lea) 303 (1880). To constitute a valid advancement, the property must be
delivered to the advancee in the advancor's lifetime. City National Bank v. Morrissey, 97
Conn. 480, 117 A. 493 (1922); Mason and Holman's Admrs. v. Holman, 78 Tenn. (IO
Lea) 315 (1882); West v. Jones, 85 Va. 616, 8 S.E. 468 (1889). Cf. Davis v. Garrett,
supra this note.
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advancement depends on the intent of the advancor, can lead to disastrous results. A child may be willing to receive property as a gift,
which he might prefer not to take as part of his portion in his father's
estate. If his father does not inform him that the transfer is an advancement, he may think that it is an absolute gift. The only justification for the rule laid down by the courts is that the child is
charged with knowledge of the law and if he accepts the property
without first ascertaining his father's intention, he is deemed to have
accepted the property as a part portion.
In Hartwell v. Rice,248 a father-in-law gave money to his son-in-law
for support of his insane daughter. The son-in-law acknowledged in
writing that this was an advancement to the daughter. The Massachusetts court held that the money so received should be charged as an
advancement. In that case the court did not hold that an advancee
need not be of sound mind at the time of the transfer. The decision
was based on the fact that prior to the married woman's act a wife's
personal property was vested in her husband. Therefore, the acknowledgement by the husband was sufficient to charge it as part of his wife's
share in her father's estate.
That case suggests an interesting problem. If the transferee of
property is insane at the time of transfer, a person might argue that
his lack of mental capacity prevents the amount received by him from
beihg charged as an advancement. However, the law presumes the
acceptance of a bene:6.cial gift by one who, because of his feebleness
of mind, is incapable of accepting it.249 Since the intent of the advancee is generally regarded as immaterial and an advancement is
said to be a gift, most courts would hold that the advancee need not
be of sound mind at the time he accepted the property.
C.

Time When Title Must Pass

Many cases state that it is necessary to the existence of an advancement that irrevocable title to the property pass to the advancee in the
lifetime of the advancor. 250 These same cases often define an advancement as "a perfect and irrevocable gift." Most cases make such
67 Mass. (1 Gray) 587 (1854).
Pohl v. Fulton, 86 Kan. 14, 119 P. 716 (1911); Malone's Committee v. Lebus,
116 Ky. 975, 77 S.W. 180 (1903).
250 McClellan v. McCauley, 158 Miss. 456, 130 S. 145 (1930); Greene v. Greene,
145 Miss. 87, llO S. 218 (1926); Nobles v. Davenport, 183 N.C. 207, lll S.E. 180
(1922). Cf. Batton v. Allen, 5 N.J. Eq. (1 Halst.) 99 (1845). In that case a parent, after
his son's death, satisfied a judgment held against him. On the parent's death, his administrators sought to deduct the amount of the judgment from the grandchild's distributive
share. Held, that the transfer must occur in the lifetime of the advancee.
248
249
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statements by way of dicta.251 However, in the recent case of Albers
252
11. Y oung,
the Colorado court held that an advancement must be an
irrevocable gift in the lifetime of the advancor. In that case an intestate opened a joint bank account in his name and that of his daughter.
Only two deposits were made, both by him, and solely from his funds.
By statute, a joint bank account in Colorado may be paid to anyone of
the joint depositors, whether the other is living or not. The court held
that the money in the account was not an advancement to the daughter.
Although that case seems in accord with conventional advancement concepts, other cases have reached a different result. In Thompson 11. Latimer,2 53 the same definitions were relied on in an effort to
convince the Kentucky court that a life insurance policy in which the
insured reserved the right to change the beneficiary was not an advancement. The court rejected that contention and held that the
policies should be charged to the child as a part portion. Other cases
are to the same effect.254
In Hughey 11. Eichelherger, 255 the South Carolina court held that
land conveyed by an intestate to a trustee for the benefit of his daughter
was an advancement, even though he reserved the right to revoke the
trust.

D.

Intestacy of the Ad11ancor

A parent or other person to whom the doctrine of advancements
applies, may make a gift to one of his children, and on his death leave
a will disposing of all his property. Under such circumstances, all
courts hold that the doctrine of advancements is inapplicable. The
courts reach this result by holding that the foundation of the doctrine
is to effectuate the presumed intent of a parent that his children should
share equally in his estate, but where he disposes of his entire estate
by will his directions are given. Therefore, if one child receives more
than another, he did not intend for them to share equally.256
251 Fennell v. Henry, 70 Ala. 484 (1881); Stacy v. Stacy, 175 Ark. 763, 300 S.W.
437 (1927); Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927); Grattan v. Grattan, 18
ill. (8 Peck) 167 (1856).
252 119 Colo. 37, 199 P. (2d) 890 (1948).
2113 209 Ky. 491, 273 S.W. 65 (1925).
254 Culberhouse v. Culberhouse, 68 Ark. 405, 59 S.W. 38 (1900); Justice v. Mead,
220 Ky. 638, 295 S.W. 976 (1927); Rickenbacker v. Zimmerman, 10 S.C. 110 (1878).
255 11 s.c. 36 (1878).
256 Harper v. Harris, (8th Cir. 1923) 294 F. 44; Alward v. Woodward, 315 ru. 150,
146 N.E. 154 (1925); In re Morgan's Estate, 226 Iowa 68, 281 N.W. 346 (1938); Pole
v. Simmons, 45 Md. 246 (1876); Domzalski v. Domzalski, 303 Mich. 103, 5 N.W. (2d)
672 (1942); In re Staples' Estate, 214 Minn. 337, 8 N.W. (2d) 45 (1943); In re Beier's
Estate, 205 Minn. 43, 284 N.W. 833 (1939); Kuhne v. Gau, 138 Minn. 34, 163 N.W.
962 (1917); Kragnes v. Kragnes, 125 Minn. ll5, 145 N.W. 785 (1914); Graham v. Karr,
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Also, most advancement statutes read: "If any estate, real or personal, has been given by an intestate. . . ." The words of such a
statute require it to be construed as applying only to persons dying
wholly intestate.257 In In re Bush's Estate,258 a parent made advancements to a son. In 1931, he executed a will naming this son as a
residuary legatee. Between 1931 and 1939 when he died, he made
several more advancements to him. The advancements were evidenced by non-interest-bearing notes which provided that the amount
therein stated should be deducted from the son's share of the estate.
The Kansas court required the son to account for advancements made
after the execution of the will. That case is contrary to the overwh~lming weight of authority which holds that a testator is conclusively presumed to have intended all voluntary transfers of property,
whether made prior or subsequent to the will, to be absolute gifts. The
underlying theory of these decisions is that a will speaks from the date
of the testator's death. 259 The only justification for the decision in
In re Bush's Estate, supra, is to hold that the doctrines of ademption
or satisfaction of a legacy apply to a residuary legatee. 260
Often a child borrows money from a parent and executes a note
which provides that it shall be regarded as an advancement if the
parent dies before the payment is made. On the parent's death testate, the child may claim that he cannot be charged with the sum so
received. Most courts hold that-the sum so received can be charged
as a part of the child's share of the estate.261 The Massachusetts court
holds that the child cannot be compelled to account. 262 The view of
the Massachusetts court is preferable. In an agreement of this type
331 Mo. 1157, 55 S.W. (2d) 995 (1935); Wickliffe v. Wickliffe, 206 Mo. App. 42, 226
S.W. 1035 (1920); In re Lear's Estate, 146 Mo. App. 642, 124 S.W. 592 (1910); In re
Wantz's Estate, 137 Neb. 307, 289 N.W. 363 (1939); In re Willis' Estate, 158 Misc.
534, 287 N.Y.S. 165 (1936); In re Bernhard's Estate, 151 Misc. 480, 273 N.Y.S. 250 ·
(1934); Prevette v. Prevette, 203 N.C. 89, 164 S.E. 623 (1928); Dodson v. Fulk, 147
N.C. 530, 61 S.E. 383 (1908); In re Loesch's Estate, 322 Pa. 105, 185 A. 191 (1936);
O'Connor v. Flick, 271 'Pa. 249, 114 A. 636 (1921); McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig,
23 Tenn. A. 434, 134 S.W. 197 (1939); Bailey v. Bailey, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 212
S.W. (2d) 189; In re Sipchen's Estate, 180 Wis. 504, 193 N.W. 385 (1923).
251 Linell's Admr. v. Linell, 21 N.J. Eq. 81 (1870).
258 155 Kan. 556, 127 P. (2d) 455 (1942). Cf. Toomer

v. Toomer, 5 N.C. (I
Murph.) 93 (1805).
259 Wickliffe v. Wickliffe, 206 Mo. App. 42, 226 S.W. 1035 (f920); In re Pardee's
Estate, 240 Wis. 19, 1 N.W. (2d) 803 (1942).
2ao Hayes v. Welling, 38 R.I. 553, 96 A. 843 (1916).
2 61Jn re Esmond's Estate, 154 Ill. App. 357 (1910); Kinney v. Newbold, 115 Iowa
145, 88 N.W. 328 (1901); City National Bank of San Saba v. Penn, (Tex. Civ. App.
1936) 92 S.W. (2d) 532. Cf. Robinson v. Ramsey, 161 Ga. 1, 129 S.E. 837 (1925).
2a2 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Underwood, 297 Mass. 320, 8 N.E. (2d) 792 (1937);
In re Pardee's Estate, 240 Wis. 19, 1 N.W. (2d) 803 (1942). Cf. In re Lake's Estate, 214
Wis. 474, 253 N.W. 174 (1934). In that case a testatrix left surviving only brothers and
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there is no enforceable obligation. If the parent were to sue the child,
the latter would contend that he had the right to elect how payment
should be effected and that he elected to have it charged as part of his
inheritance. In such a suit the child would win. The transaction
is at most an advancement with a right in the advancee to elect whether
he will let it be charged as a part of his inheritance or change the
character of the transaction to a loan by paying the advancor. 263
In some cases, a testator provides that his estate should descend as
if no will had been made. For instance, in Trammel 11. T rammel, 264
a testator provided that realty should descend the same as if no will
had been made. The court ruled that the testator intended for advancements to be taken into account in the division of his estate. In
DeCourmant 11. Beyert,265 a testator bequeathed his property ". . . as
provided by the laws of the State of New York in cases of intestacy."
The court held that advancements need not be accounted for. These
cases appear to be in direct conB.ict. The only possible reconciliation
is that both cases involve the construction of a will and the court was
simply ascertaining the intent qf the testator. On that basis and on
no other can they be distinguished. 265 a
Many times a parent makes an advancement and then decides to
make a will. If he revokes or cancels the will, the doctrine of advancements is applicable. As a justification for this rule, the courts state
sisters. One of her brothers gave her a certificate which stated that testatrix had advanced
him $1000, to be repaid with interest at some future time "or amount taken from my
share or share of my heirs from estate." Held, that the $1000 was to be deducted from
the brother's share of the estate. Since the parties were brothers and sisters, the doctrine
of advancements was inapplicable.
263 Cf. Leask v. McCarthy, 147 App. Div. 796, 132 N.Y.S. 92 (1911).
264 148 Ind. 487, 47 N.E. 925 (1897).
2 65 36 Hun (N.Y.) 382 (1885); LeCoulteux de Caumont Exr. v. Morgan, affd. 104
N.Y. 74, 9 N.E. 861 (1887). On appeal the New York Court of Appeals affirmed because
the transfers were not intended as advancements. The court indicated that the doctrine
of advancements was applicable to such a case.
265aHarris v. Allen, 18 Ga. 177 (1855). In that case a testator directed that his
property should be distributed according to the statute of distributions. Both the court and
the parties litigant assumed that the doctrine was applicable. Croom v. Herring, 11 N.C.
393 (1826). In that case testator devised his property " ••. to be divided among all my
heirs agreeable to the statute of distribution of intestates' estates." Held, that advancements
need not be accounted for. Brown v. Brown, 37 N.C. (2 Ired. L.) 309 (1842); Raiford
v. Raiford, 41 N.C. (6 Ired. Eq.) 490 (1849). In that case a deed of trust provided that
after the death of the grantor the property should be equally divided "among all the rest
of my heirs and distributees .•. in the same manner, and according to the rules of descent
and distribution in intestate estates .•• .'' Held, that advancements must be accounted for.
The court distinguished the case of Croom v. Herring, supra this note, in the following
language at 499: "At all events, that decision has no application to the point now under
consideration. There, the word 'heirs' was used in reference to personal property. Here,
the word 'heirs' is used in reference to land, and the word 'distributees' in reference to
personal property-both words of definite legal meaning.•••"
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that if the making of a will indicates an intent to extinguish an .advancement, then revoki}?-g or cancelling the will indicates a change of
purpose. 266 Likewise, if the will is wholly invalid or inoperative the
doctrine of advancements is applicable. 267
I. Parti.al Intestacy. A testator may make advancements to some
of his children during his lifetime and his will may be drawn in such
a way that he dies intestate as to part of his property. Under such
circumstances, the courts in most jurisdictions hold that advancements
cannot be charged to the children. 268 The English cases reach this
conclusion on the technical rule that, since there is a will, the testator
did not die intestate within the meaning of the statute.269 In England,
since the passage of the Administration of Estates Act of 1925, the
doctrine of advancements is applicable to cases of partial intestacy. 270
The American decisions are based in part on the language of the
stqtute and also on the presumed intent of the testator to create an
inequality which would be defeated if children were compelled to
account for advancements. 271
The California statute uses the word "decedent'' rather than the
word "intestate." In that state the courts hold that the doctrine is
applicable where a person dies intestate as to part of his property.272
In Ohio, although the statute reads: "If any estate, real or personal,
has been given by an intestate . . . ,"273 the court tends to consider
the advanceill:ent concept applicable to cases of partial intestacy.274
266 Hartwell v.
261 In re Ford,

Rice, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 587 (1854).
[1902] 2 Ch. 605. Cf. Prichard v. Prichard, 91 W.Va. 398, 113 S.E.

256 (1922).
268 Blankes v. Clark, 68 Ark. 98, 56 S.W. 1063 (1900); Gilmore v. Jenkins, 129
Iowa 686, 106 N.W. 193 (1906); Hayden v. Burch, 9 Gill (Md.) 79 (1850); Stewart v.
Pattison, 8 Gill (Md.) 46 (1849); In re Finck's Estate, 120 Misc. 428, 198 N.Y.S. 670
(1923); In re Ogden's Estate, 211 Pa. 247, 60 A. 785 (1905). Cf. Leffier v. Leffier, 151
Fla. 455, 10 S. (2d) 799 (1942).
269 Cowper v. Scott, 3 P. Wms. 119, 24 Eng. Rep. 993 (1731); Walton v. Walton,
14 Ves. Jr. 318, 33 Eng. Rep. 543 (1807).
210 15 Geo. V., c. 23, §49 (1925).
271 Gilmore v. Jenkins, 129 Iowa 686, 106 N.W. 193 (1906); Hayden v. Burch, 9
Gill (Md.) 46 (1849); Linell's Admr. v. Linell, 21 N.J. Eq. 81 (1870).
.
272 In re Rawnsley's Estate, (Cal. App. 1949) 210 P. (2d) 888; In re Hayne's Estate,
165 Cal. 568, 133 P. 277 (1913). In that case the court said at 573: "It is suggested by
the respondent that the statutory provisions regarding advancements do not apply, except
in cases where the decedent dies wholly intestate. Some of the decisions so declare because
the statute under consideration was believed to contain such a limitation. Kent v. Hopkins,
86 Hun 611, •.• where the statute began with the words 'If any child of an intestate,'
is an example. Our code contains no words which imply a similar limitation."
213 Ohio Code Ann. (Baldwin, 1940) §10503-19.
274 Dittoes Admr. v. Cluney's Exr., 22 Ohio St. 436 (1872); Wright v. Merchant,
2 Ohio Dec. 742 (1862).
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The courts of that state hold that the doctrine is not applicable where
the will shows that the testator thought he had disposed of his entire
estate.21is
The Tennessee statute reads: "Absolute equality shall be observed
in the division of the estates of deceased persons, except where a will
has been made, and its provisions make equality impossible."276 In
construing this statute the courts of that state hold that the doctrine
of advancements applies to partial intestacy and that persons claiming
a share of the undevised estate must account for advancements.277
The Kentucky,278 Virginia,279 and West Virginia280 advancement
statutes are, by their very language, applicable where the will does
not dispose of all the testator's property. The Kentucky statute requires a devisee to account for the value of the property devised to him
before he can share in the part of the estate not disposed of by the
testator's will. 281 In Virginia, the courts, in construing the advancement statute, have reached a like result.282 Since the West Virginia
statute is almost identical with the Virginia legislation, the courts of
that state will undoubtedly follow the Virginia rule.
2. Applicability of the Doctrine of Advancements to a Pretermitted Child. Many states have statutes which provide that a child
not named or provided for in his parent's will shall receive a share of
the estate as in the case of intestacy, unless such child shall have been
provided for by the testator in his lifetime or unless it appears that the
omission was intentional, and not occasioned by accident or mistake.
A parent may have made advancements to his children and later die
testate, leaving as an heir a child not provided for in his will. In Sanford v. Sanford,283 the New York court, without much discussion of
the problem, held that such a child could compel the other children
to account for advancements. However, in Gibson v. Johnson, 284 the
Missouri court held that the doctrine of advancements was inapplicable.
211, Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432 (1857).
276 Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) §8402.
211 Pearce v. Gleaves, IO Yerg. (Tenn.) 359 (1837).
218Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140.
219Va. Code Ann. (1950) §64.17.
280W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §4094.
281 Nolan's Exrs. v. Nolan, 220 Ky. 613, 295 S.W. 893 (1927); StifFs Exr. v. Stiff,
217 Ky. 716, 290 S.W. 718 (1927); Brewer's Admr. v. Brewer, 181 Ky. 400, 205 S.W.
393 (1918); Farley v. Stacey, 177 Ky. 109, 197 S.W. 636 (1917); Gulley v. Lillard's
Exr., 145 Ky. 746, 141 S.W. 58 (1911).
282 Poff v. Poff, 128 Va. 62, 104 S.E. 719 (1920); Payne v. Payne, 128 Va. 33, 104
S.E. 712 (1920).
2sa 61 Barb. (N.Y.) 293 (1872).
284 331 Mo. 1198, 56 S.W. (2d) 783 (1932); Wilson v. Miller, (Va. Spec. Ct. App.
1855) 1 Pat. and H. 353. See In re Rawnsley's Estate, (Cal. App. 1949) 210 P. (2d) 888.
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The court based its conclusion on the language of the statute which
requires a person who has received an advancement to elect to "come
into partition with the other parceners." The court pointed out that
the title to an estate by coparceny is always by descent; that the persons
who had received advancements took title by devise as distinguished
from descent, and that the advancement statute did not apply to devisees. The court distinguished Sanford v. Sanford on the ground
that the language of the New York advancement statute was different.
3. Applicability of the Doctrine if a Widow Elects to Take Against
Her Husband's Will. Under our laws of descent and distribution, a
husband must leave a certain part of his estate to his wife. If he leaves
her less than the amount he is required to leave her, she may el,ect to
take against his will as if he died intestate.
In North Carolina, one of the few states in which a widow can
compel children to account for advancements, a widow, if she elects
to take against her husband's will, can compel her children to account
for advancements. 285 That decision seems erroneous in that the supreme court of that state has held in other cases that the doctrine of
advancements is not applicable to cases of partial intestacy.286 In Indiana, a widow cannot compel her children to account for advancements. However, the supreme court of that state in the case of Banner
v. Allen,281 by way of dictum, stated that a widow's election to inherit
as if her husband died intestate did not entitle her to compel her children to account for advancements. The court pointed out that her
husband had not died totally intestate.
·
The dictum of the Indiana court is preferable to the North Carolina decision. The customary statutory words, "her share is to be
ascertained as if the husband died intestate," are not to be used for the
purpose of allowing the widow to take advantage of advancements, but
are used to indicate that the wife of the testator is entitled to a specified
share of his estate. If, by his will, she inherited the amount she would
be entitled to as if he died intestate, she could not take advantage of
advancements. By analogy, she should not be permitted to take advantage of advancements if she elects to take against his will.

E. Necessity of a Writing Charging a Gift as an Advancement
In California, Illinois, Maine, Nevada and Oregon, a child cannot
be charged with an advancement in the •distribution of his father's
285 Credle v. Credle, 44 N.C. (1 Busbee L.) 225 (1853).
286 Jerkins v. Mitchell, 57 N.C. (4 Jones Eq.) 207 (1858).
287 Banner v. Allen, 25 Ind. 222 (1865).
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estate unless it is (I) charged as such in the gift or grant or (2)
charged in writing by the intestate or (3) acknowledged in writing
as such by the person to whom the gift or grant was made.288
In several other states the advancement statutes have a provision
which reads substantially as follows: "All gifts and grants shall be
deemed to have been made as an advancement if they are expressed
in the gift or grant to be so made or if charged in writing by the intestate as an advancement or acknowledged in writing as such by the
child or descendant."289
The courts, in construing the above statute, uniformly hold that
a gift is not an advancement unless charged in writing in one of the
ways enumerated in the statute. The basis for this holding is that the
legislature, by implication, intended to exclude all other ways of proving
advancements.290
288 Cal. Probe Code (Deering, 1941) §1050. That section reads as follows: "A gift
before death shall he considered as an ademption of a bequest or devise of the property
given; but such gift shall not be taken as an advancement to an heir or as an ademption
of a general legacy unless such intention is expressed by the testator in the grant or otherwise in writing, or unless the donee acknowledges it in writing to he such." In re Rawnsley's Estate, (Cal. App. 1949) 210 P. (2d) 888; ill. Stat. Ann. (1947) c. 3, §166; Wallace
v. Reddick, 119 ill. 151, 8 N.E. 801 (1886). In that case an intestate conveyed property
to his sons prior to 1872, and died in 1874. In 1872 illinois passed a statute requiring a
writing before a transfer of property shall he an advancement. Since the intestate did not
charge the transfers in writing as an advancement, the court ruled that they could not he
so considered. The court said at 158: "This whole matter of descent of property is within
legislative control. Heirs apparent and prospective distributees, during the ancestor's lifetime, have no vested rights in his estate, nor in the laws of descent. Accordingly, it is held
the application of a statute changing the rules of descent of property impairs no vested
rights. This statute is not in terms made prospective in its operation. It seems to have been
intended to apply to all advancements.•.•" Elliott v. Western Coal and Mining Co., 243
ill. 614, 90 N.E. 1104 (1910); Young v. Young, 204 ill. 430, 68 N.E. 532 (1903);
Bartmess v. Fuller, 170 ill. 193, 48 N.E. 452 (1897); Meppen v. Meppen, 392 ill. 30,
63 N.E. (2d) 755 (1945); Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 156, §4; Porter v. Porter, 51 Me. 376
(1862); Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1941) §9882.303; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1940) §16-304.
289Jdaho Code Ann. (1932) §14-109; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 196, §5; Mich.
Stat. Ann. (1937) §27.3178 (160); Minn. Stat. Ann. (1946) §525.53; Mont. Rev. Code
Ann. (1947) §91.414; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §30-115; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §30-2114;
Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 84, §225; S.D. Code (1939) §56.0116; Utah Code Ann. (1943)
§101-4-20; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1932) §1351; Wis. Stat. (1947) §318.27.
290 Barton v. Rice, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 508 (1839); Bullard v. Bullard, 22 Mass. (5
Pick.) 527 (1827); Bulkeley v. Noble, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 337 (1824); Olney v. Brown,
163 Mich. 125, 128 N.W. 241 (1910); Lodge v. Fitch, 72 Neb. 652, 101 N.W. 338
(1904); Baden v. Mier, 71 Neb. 191, 98 N.W. 761 (1904); Courtney v. Daniel, 124
Okla. 46, 253 P. 990 (1927); In re Yates' Estate, 88 Okla. 259, 213 P. 87 (1923); Mowry
Admr. v. Smith, 5 R.I. 255 (1858); Petition of Atkinson, 16 R.I. 413, 16 A. 712 (1889);
Adams' Heirs v. Adams, 22 Vt. 50 (1849); Newell v. Newell, 13 Vt. 24 (1841); Schmidt
v. Schmidt's Estate, 123 Wis. 295, 101 N.W. 678 (1904); Pomeroy v. Pomeroy, 93 Wis.
262, 67 N.W. 430 (1896). Cf. Hornstra v. Avon State Bank, 55 S.D. 513, 226 N.W. 740
(1929). In that case a parent gave one of his children a sum of money. They agreed
that if the child did not pay the money it was to be charged as a part of her inheritance.
In South Dakota a writing is required to charge a child with an advancement. On the father's
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In Georgia, the statute reads: " . . . a memorandum of advancements in the handwriting of the parent or subscribed by him, shall be
evidence of the fact of advancement."291 The Georgia court was called
upon to construe this statute in the case of Bransford v. Crawford.292
In that case, oral declarations of an intestate that notes held by him
were advancements to his sons were held admiss~ble to prove advancements. The court stated that the legislature did not, by the enactment
of the statute, intend to require a writing to prove advancements. The
legislative intention was to set forth one way by which advancements
may be proved.
In Vermont, an advancement in real estate must be proved in the
following ways: (1) where in the gift or grant it is expressed to be an
advancement, or (2) where the conveyance is for the recited consideration of love and affection, or (3) where the conveyance is acknowledged as such in writing by the advancee. Before a child may be
charged with personal property as an advancement, the proof must
show that the property was delivered to the child expressly as an advancement in the presence of two witnesses. 293
In New Hampshire, real estate given by a parent to a child is not
an advancement unless (I) the deed recites that the consideration is
love and affection or (2) it is proved to be an advancement by some
acknowledgment signed by the party receiving it.2-94 Personal property
cannot be charged as an advancement unless (1) proved to be such by
an acknowledgment in writing, signed by the party receiving it,
(2) by some charge or memorandum thereof in writing, made by the
deceased or by his order, or (3) unless delivered expressly as an advancement in the presence of two witnesses who are requested to take
notice thereof. 295
In Rhode Island, real estate conveyed by deed or gift is an advancement. Personal property delivered to a child or grandchild may be
charged as an advancement only if (1) charged as such in writing by
death intestate the court ruled that the ~ could be charged to the son's share of the
estate. The court pointed out that the money could not be charged as an advancement,
but based its conclusion on the right of retainer doctrine.
291 Ga. Code Ann. (Parks,
292 51 Ga. 20 (1874).
293 Vt. Stat. (1947)
294 N.H. Rev. Laws

1937) §113-1014.

§3067.
(1942) c. 360, §15.
295 N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 360, §16.
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the intestate or his order or (2) delivered expressly for that purpose
in the presence of two witnesses who are requested to take notice
thereof.296
If the statute requires a writing before a gift may be charged as an
advancement, the writing need not use that word, for it is sufficient if
a reading of the instrument shows that such was the writer's intention.297 A parent cannot meet the requirements of the statute by
making a charge against a child in his regular book of accounts. 298
If the charges against the children are kept in a regular book of accounts
but are kept separate and apart from charges against third persons,
there is a sufficient compliance with the statute.299
Since statutes of the type under discussion require advancements
to be proved by written instruments, no material or essential part of
the proof can be supplied by parol.800 If an intestate makes an ambiguous written charge against a child, the acts and declarations of the
intestate accompanying the making of the charge may be shown for the
purpose of ascertaining his intention.301
The writing required by a statute of this type, must be executed
contemporaneously with the transfer of the property. A writing made
after the transaction cannot be used as proof of an advancement because it is in the nature of hearsay evidence. The courts reach this
result partly by analogy to the rule which requires an entry in a book of
20s R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 567, §23; Mowry Achnr. v. Smith, 5 R.I. 255 (1858).
In that case an intestate during his lifetime, transferred a real estate mortgage to three of
his grandchildren in consideration of love and affection. In Rhode Island a mortgage of
real estate is personal property. Held, that this could not be charged as an advancement.
The reasons were (1) that it was not charged as such by a memorandum in writing ancl
(2) that the evidence did not show that it was delivered as an advancement in the presence
of witnesses who were requested to take notice thereof.
297Young v. Young, 204 Ill. 430, 68 N.E. 532 (1903); Bulkeley v. Noble, 19 Mass.
(2 Pick.) 337 (1824); In re Yates Estate, 88 Okla. 259, 213 P. 87 (1923); Appeal of
Ashley, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 21 (1826). Cf. Biglow v. Poole, 76 Mass. (IO Gray) 104
(1857). In that case the intestate's account book contained the following statement on the
title page: "Small book referred to in my last will and testament, Elated Aug. 2d 1843,
showing the moneys I have advanced to my children, severally, and. to which I shall give
credit to any or each of them, as they may pay me from time to time. • • ." Held, that the
charges in the book were intended to be debts and not advancements.
298 Fellows v. Little, 46 N.H. 27 (1865); Brown v. Brown, 16 Vt. 197 (1844). Cf.
Weatherhead v. Field, 26 Vt. 665 (1854).
299Young v. Young, 204 III. 430, 68 N.E. 532 (1903).
soo Fellows v. Little, 46 N.H. 27 (1865); Law v. Smith, 2 R.I. 244 (1852); Weather•
head v. Field, 26 Vt. 665 (1854).
so1 Elliott v. Western Coal and Mining Co., 243 Ill. 614, 90 N.E. 1104 (1910);
Liesse v. Fontaine, 181 Wis. 407, 195 N.W. 393 (1923); Arthur v. Arthur, 143 Wis.
126, 126 N.W. 550 (1910). Cf. In re Hessler's Estate, 79 Neb. 691, 113 N.W. 147
(1907).
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accounts to be made at the time of the transaction, and partly by analogy
to the rule that the intent of the advancor at the time of the transfer
controls. Relying on these reasons, the courts hold that where an
advancement is charged in the manner required by statute, subsequent
oral declarations of the intestate are not admissible to prove that an
absolute gift was intended. 302
If a parent charges a child with an advancement as required by
statute and subsequently destroys the writing, his act changes the advancement to an absolute gift. 303 Likewise, if the writing making the
charge was always in the advancor's possession, and is not found in
his papers at his death, the writing is presumed to have been destroyed
by him and the child cannot be charged with an advancement.304
In Hartwell 11. Rice,3° 5 a father charged an advancement to his
daughter in the manner required by statute. Subsequently, he executed a will in which he converted the advancement to an absolute
gift. Later he_ revoked the_ will and died intestate. It was held that
the will, since it never took effect, did not extinguish the advancement.
The court also pointed out that if the making of the will showed a
desire to extinguish the advancement, the cancelling of the will indicated a change of that purpose.
The Massachusetts statute, like several others, provides that a child
may be charged with an advancement where it is acknowledged as such
by him. In Fitts 11. Morse, 306 the court of that state was called upon to
construe that part of the statute. In that case, the children of an intestate agreed, during his lifetime, that money owed by some of them
to him should be treated as advancements in the settlement of his estate.
The intestate did not approve of the agreement. It was held that this
was not an acknowledgment of an advancement as required by statute.

VII
PRESUMPTIONS

A. The Majority Rule
In an earlier part of this monograph, we saw that the intent of the
transferor determines whether a conveyance is an advancement or a
302 Bulkeley v. Noble, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 337 (1824); Fellows v. Little, 46 N.H. 27
(1865); Weatherhead v. Field, 26 Vt. 665 (1854).
303 Marshall v. Coleman, 89 Ill. App. 41 (1899), modified 187 Ill. 556, 58 N.E. 628
(1900).

-304Jhid.

67 Mass. (1 Gray) 587 (1854).
103 Mass. 164 (1869). See also In re Sipchen's Estate, 180 Wis. 504, 193 N.W.
385 (1923).
305

306

1953]

AnvANCEMENTS

249

gift.307 Often property is transferred by a parent to a child without
any outward manifestations of intent on the part of the former. Since
the advancement statutes have not created a statutory presumption to
enable the courts to determine the intent of the advancor, they have
made their own presumption. 308 That presumption is that all substantial voluntary transfers are prima facie ~dvancements. 309
The basis of the rule is that the natural affection of a parent is as
strong for one child as for another. Therefore, in the distribution of
his property he will treat all of his children equally and fairly so that
all of them will share equally in his estate, not only in what remains
at his death, but equally in all that comes from him. 310
The Supreme Court of Iowa has demonstrated the reason for the
rule under discussion by use of the following example. Suppose one
child has married and his father gives him eighty acres of land. Later,
when the second son also weds, a similar gift is made. However, the
father may die before all of his children have received such a gift.
Under such circumstances he undoubtedly intended for all of them
to share equally. If the conveyances made by him in his lifetime are
not charged as advancements, the older children who received the
property inherit more than the younger ones. Therefore, by presuming that pe intended to charge the children with advancements,
a just result is reached. 311
An analysis of that example shows that the court was merely doing
307 Supra p. 231.
308 Johnson v. Belden, 20 Conn. 322 (1850); Packard v. Packard, 95 Kan. 644, 149
P. 404 (1915).
309Watt v. Lee, 238 Ala. 451, 191 S. 628 (1939); Dent v. Foy, 206 Ala. 454, 90
S. 317 (1921), 210 Ala. 475, 98 S. 390 (1923); Clements Admr. v. Hood, 57 Ala. 459
(1876); Rumbly v. Stainton, 24 Ala. 712 (1854); Smith's Guardian v. Smith's Admrs.,
21 Ala. 761 (1852); Goodwin v. Parnell, 69 Ark. 629, 65 S.W. 427 (1901); Sewell v.
Everett, 57 Fla. 529, 49 S. 187 (1910); Neal v. Neal, 153 Ga. 44, 111 S.E. 387 (1922);
Howard v. Howard, 101 Ga. 224, 28 S.E. 648 (1897); Wenbert v. Lincoln Nat. Bank and
Trust Co., 116 Ind. App. 31, 61 N.E. (2d) 466 (1945); Culp v. Wilson, 133 Ind. 294,
32 N.E. 928 (1893); Ruch Admr. v. Biery, llO Ind. 444, 11 N.E. 312 (1887); In re
Wiese's Estate, 222 Iowa 935, 270 N.W. 380 (1936); Fell v. Bradshaw, 205 Iowa 100,
215 N.W. 595 (1927); In re Sell's Estate, 197 Iowa 696, 197 N.W. 922 (1924); O'Connell v. O'Connell, 73 Iowa 733, 36 N.W. 764 (1887); Burns v. Burns, 87 Kan. 19, 123
P. 720 (1912); Pilkington v. Wheat, 330 Mo. 767, 51 S.W. (2d) 42 (1932); Pitts v.
Metzger, 195 Mo. App. 677, 187 S.W. 610 (1916); Ray v. Loper, 65 Mo. 470 (1877);
Gordon v. Barkelew, 6 N.J. Eq. (2 Halst.) 94 (1874); Kintz v. Friday, 4 Dem. Sur. (N.Y.)
540 (1886); Thompson v. Smith, 160 N.C. 256, 75 S.E. 1010 (1912); Ex Parte Griffin,
142 N.C. 116, 54 S.E. 1007 (1906); Storey's Appeal, 83 Pa. 89 (1887); Johnson's Admr.
v. Patterson, 81 Tenn. (13 Lea) 626 (1884); Morris v. Morris, 56 Tenn. (9 Heisk.) 814
(1872); Poff v. Poff, 128 Va. 62, 104 S.E. 719 (1920); Johnson v. Mundy, 123 Va. 730,
97 S.E. 564 (1918).
310 Goodwin v. Parnell, 69 Ark. 629, 65 S.W. 427 (1901); Plowman v. Nicholson,
81 Kan. 215, 105 P. 692 (1909).
311 Bash v. Bash, 182 Iowa 55, 165 N.W. 399 (1917).
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what it thought the intestate worild have done had he considered the
problem. The statute of distributions makes a will for a person who
dies intestate. Like the statute of distributions, the courts, in creating
the presumption, are doing what they believe the intestate would have
done if he had executed a will on the day of his death. The scope and
operation of that prima facie presumption is to cast upon the party
against whom it operates, the duty of introducing sufficient evidence
to rebut it. However, the authors of the Model Probate Code take a
different view of the problem. They have reversed the presumption
so that "every gratuitous inter vivas transfer is deemed to be an absolute
gift and not an advancement unless shown to be an advancement."312
Their view is shared by the Texas court and by the Connecticut court
where the transfer is of personal property.

B.

The Texas Rule

Since Texas is a community property state, the writer was inclined
to believe that its courts would hold that a transfer by a parent to a
child would, on the former' s death, be presumed to be an advancement. However, the courts of that state hold that the presumption is
one of absolute gift. They merely place the burden of proof on the
party alleging that a voluntary transfer is an advancement: The theory
of those decisions is that if the parent intended his children to share
equally in his separate estate, he would attach conditions to the gift
so it would be an advancement, or that failing so to provide, he certainly would have taken care of the matter by will. Therefore, if he
elects not to follow either of the above methods, the only reasonable
assumption is that he did not intend for his children to share equally
in his estate at his death. 313 The Texas decisions do not require that
312 S1:MEs AND BAsYB, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAw
318 Andrews v. Brown, (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 283

65-68 (1946).
S.W. 288, affd. (Tex. Civ. App.
1928) 10 S.W. (2d) 707; Rutherford v. Deaver, (Tex. Comm. App. 1921) 235 S.W.
853, reversing Rutherford v. Deaver, (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 218 S.W. 31. In that case
the court of appeals held that a deed from a parent to a child in consideration of love and
affection is on the farmer's death deemed an advancement. The court did not rely on other
Texas advancement decisions, but on a quotation from Carpus Juris and the Texas cases
of Landrum v. Landrum, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 130 S.W. 907 (1910), and Lott v.
Kaiser, 61 Tex. 665 (1884). Those cases did not involve the doctrine in its technical
sense. In both cases the question to be determined was whether the purchase of property
by a parent in his child's name was a resulting trust. On appeal, the Court of Commission
Appeals reversed because the decision of the court was not in accord with Texas law.
Smart v. Panther, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 262, 95 S.W. 679 (1906); Sparks v. Spence, 40 Tex.
694 (1874). In that case the court held that property conveyed by a father to a child
after the death of the farmer's wife is presumed to be an advancement. That decision is
based on the Texas law of community property.
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the advancement be expressed in writing before it can be charged as
such but merely place the burden of proof on the party claiming that
a gift from a parent to a child is an advancement.314
C.

The Connecticut Rule

In Connecticut, the relationship of parent and child is not sufficient
to give rise to the presumption that the delivery of a chattel or money
by the one to the other is an advancement. The court feels that a
parent may be liberal with a child without placing him under future
accountability to his estate and that he may discriminate in his favor
if he chooses. If he intended to charge the personal property as an
advancement, he must evidence that intention by some method beyond
the unexplained act of delivering the property to the child. If the
intestate explicitly declares that a voluntary inter vivos transfer of personal property is an advancement, the Connecticut court would hold
that the child must account for it.315 In that state, a gift of real estate
by a parent to a child is prima facie an advancement. 316
D. The Kentucky and South Carolina Rule
In Kentucky, by statute, and in South Carolina, by judicial decision, the intent of the advancor is disregarded and all substantial gifts
are advancements.317 In both jurisdictions, the person claiming that
a child has received an advancement has the burden of proving that
the transfer was a gift rather than a loan, debt or resulting trust. If he
proves that the transfer was a gift, the courts hold that it is an advance314 Andrews v. Brown, supra note 313. Cf. Lindley v. Lindley, (Tex. Civ. App. 1915)
178 S.W. 782. In that case a father deeded land to his daughter. The deed recited a
consideration of $1000 which was to be credited against her share of the estate. Held, that
she should be charged with the sum of $1000 as an advancement.
315 Johnson v. Belden, 20 Conn. 322 (1850); Kemp v. Turman, 104 Miss. 501, 61
S. 548 (1913). In that case the Supreme Court of Mississippi said that a gift of personal
property, unless it is money to be used to purchase real estate, is prima facie a gift. That
statement was dictum because the court held that the evidence was sufficient to rebut the
presumption of advancement. The court based this dictum on its inability to find a case
holding that such a transfer was prima facie an advancement. However, in Whitfield v.
Whitfield, 40 Miss. 352 (1856), the court had held that a voluntary inter vivos transfer
of personal property was an advancement. In view of that decision the Mississippi court in
all probability will not follow the dictum of Kemp v. Turman, supra this note.
816 Hatch v. Straight, 3 Conn. 31 (1819).
817 Supra pp. 234, 236. That rule is subject to an exception in both jurisdictions.
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140 reads in part as follows: "The maintaining, or educating
or giving of money, to a child or grandchild, without any view toward a portion or settlement in life, shall not be deemed an advancement." In White v. Moore, 23 S.C. 456
(1885), the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that money expended for a medical
education was not an advancement.
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ment. 318 For instance, in White v. Moore,319 a parent loaned his son
money and took a note for the amount due. On the father's death
intestate, because the note was barred by limitations, the other children
claimed that the amount loaned was an advancement. The court ruled
that the children claiming that the transaction was an advancement had
the burden of proof.
In Farmer's Exchange Bank of Millersburg v. Moflett, 320 a parent
loaned his son money and took a note for the amount due. On the
father's death, a creditor attached the son's interest in the estate and
the son claimed that he had agreed with his father that the note should
be treated as an advancement. 321 The court held that the burden of
proving that the transfer was an advancement was on the son.

E. The Louisiana Rule
Louisiana follows the civil law doctrine of collation. Under that
doctrine, collation must take place if the advancor has formally ordered
it, or if he has remained silent on the subject.322 When the advancor
formally expresses his will that what he gave the advancee was intended
as an advantage or extra part, collation does not take place, unless the
value of the article given exceeds the disposable portion, in which case
the excess must be accounted for. 323
The declaration that the gift or legacy is made as an extra portion
may be made (1) in the instrument making the disposition or (2)
afterwards by an instrument executed before a notary public and two
witnesses 324 or by the advancor's will. 325

VIII
TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY GIVING RISE TO THE PRESUMPTION OF
ADVANCEMENT

In a leading English case, Sir G. Jessel said that ". . . nothing
could be more productive of misery in families than . . . to hold that
318 Proctor v. Proctor, 282 Ky. 20, 137 S.W. (2d) 354 (1940); Farmer's Exchange
Bank of Millersburg v. Moffett, 256 Ky. 160, 75 S.W. (2d) 1063 (1934); White v.
Moore, 23 S.C. 456 (1885).
319 23 s.c. 456 (1885).
320 256 Ky. 160, 75 S.W. (2d) 1063 (1934).
321 In that case it was to the son's advantage if the transaction were an advancement.
Otherwise, he would owe the estate nine hundred dollars. The case was reversed because
the son was permitted to testify in violation of the Kentucky Dead Man's Statute.
322 La. Civ. Code Ann. (1945) art. 1230.
323 Id., §1231.
324 Id., §1232.
325 Id., §1233; Darby v. Darby, 118 La. 328, 42 S. 953 (1907).
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every member of the family must account strictly for every sum received from a parent."326 Accordingly, the courts hold that all voluntary inter vivos transfers are not necessarily advancements. In determining whether a transaction is an advancement, the courts consider
many factors. At this point, it is advisable to consider the various types
of transfers giving rise to the presumption.

A.

Money or Property Given to a Child to Start Him in Business

If a parent gives a child money for the purpose of establishing or
enlarging a business, the courts hold that the money is given for the
purpose of establishing the child in life and is therefore presumed to
be an advancement. 327
A gift of property of little value may be charged as an advancement
if given for establishing a child in life. For instance, in Ison v. Ison/ 28
a parent transferred a stallion to his son to be used to beget foals. When
the father died intestate the other heirs sought to charge this as an
advancement. The purported advancee claimed that this was a mere
present, so trilling in nature that it should not be charged as a part
portion. The court held that the value of the stallion, since it was
bestowed on the child with a view toward settlement in life, should be
charged to him on the distribution of his father's estate.
However, a gift of substantial value given to establish a child in
business is not necessarily an advancement. In Dent v. Foy, 329 a very
wealthy parent made several voluntary inter vivos transfers to all of
his children, some of which were given to establish the child in business. The court held that the sums so received were not advancements because they were not intended as such by the intestate. From
this example we see that the intent of the advancor or donor governs,
even though the property was given to establish the children in business, and if he intended an absolute gift, the courts will follow his
wishes. Of course, in those jurisdictions where the intent of the advancor is regarded as immaterial, all voluntary inter vivos transfers of
money or property given to establish a child in life are advancements.
326Taylor v. Taylor, L.R. 20 Eq. 155 at 158 (1875).
327 Mitchell's Distributees v. Mitchell's Admr., 8 Ala. 414 (1845); Page v. Elwell,
81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927); McDonald v. McDonald, 86 Mo. App. 122 (1900);
Shiver v. Brock, 55 N.C. (2 Jones Eq.) 137 (1855); Ison v. Ison, 5 Rich Eq. (S.C.) 15
(1852).
328 5 Rich Eq. (S.C.) 15 (1852). Cf. Shiver v. Brock, 55 N.C. (2 Jones Eq.) 137
(1855). In that case a horse, some cows and hogs, a bed, some chairs, a table, some broomcom and lard amounting in value to $299 given by a parent to a daughter, was held
chargeable as an advancement.
829 206 Ala. 454, 90 S. 317 (1921), 210 Ala. 475, 98 S. 390 (1923).
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B. Marriage Portion
On a daughter's marriage, her father may give her a wedding present. Usually such gifts are substantial and the other children, on the
parent's death intestate, seek to charge the property so given as an
advancement. The courts view such a transfer as being made for the
purpose of establishing her in life and hold that it should be charged
to her as an advancement.330 However, the presumption is rebuttable,
and if the parent intended to make an absolute gift, his wishes will be
followed. 331 In those jurisdictions where the intent of the advancor
is regarded as immaterial, all substantial voluntary inter vivos transfers
by a father to a daughter on the latter's marriage are advancements.

C. Property of Trifling Value
Should a child be charged with an advancement where the property transferred by the parent to him is of small or trilling value? The
answer to this question must be in the negative.332 The reason that
a mere trifling sum is not sufficient to give rise to the presumption of
advancement is that the inconsequence of the matter on its face rebuts
the presumption.333 However, whether or not a trilling present or
gift is to be charged as an advancement depends largely on circumstances. For instance, a horse and rig, given by a parent to a child
for the latter's pleasure, has been held not to be an advancement.334
However, in another case, a stallion given by a parent to a child for
the purpose of agriculture has been held to be an advancement. 335
330 Wenbert v. Lincoln Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 116 Ind. App. 31, 61 N.E. (2d)
466 (1945). In that case an intestate gave his daughter common stock as a wedding
present. Held, that the gift was an advancement. Hollister Admr. v. Attmore, 58 N.C.
(5 Jones Eq.) 373 (1860). In that case household furniture given a daughter as a wedding
present was charged as an advancement. Carter's Exr. v. Rutland, 2 N.C. (I Hayw.) 97
(1794). In that case the court said: "When a man sends property with his daughter upon
her marriage, or to his son-in-law and daughter any short time after the marriage, it is to
be presumed prima facie, that the property is given absolutely in advancement to his
daughter•.•." Cf. Johnson v. Belden, 20 Conn. 322 (1850). In that case the court held
that household property valued at more than $500 given by a father to his daughter was
not an advancement. The decision was based on the Connecticut rule that gifts of personal
property are never prima facie advancements.
331 King's Estate, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 370 (1841). In that case a very wealthy father gave
his daughter furniture worth $1132 as a wedding present. Held, that the wealth of the
father showed that he did not intend to make an advancement.
332Griggs v. Love, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 175 (1891). In that case a diamond ring given
by a parent to a child was held to be a gift. Meadows v. Meadows, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.)
148 (1850); M'Caw v. Blewit, 2 McCord Eq. (S.C.) 90 (1827); Mitchell's Distributees
v. Mitchell, 8 Ala. 414 (1845); McDonald v. McDonald, 86 Mo. App. 122 (1900).
333 McDonald v. McDonald, 86 Mo. App. 122 (1900).
334 M'Caw v. Blewit, 2 McCord Eq. (S.C.) 90 (1827).
835 McDonald v. McDonald, supra note 333; Ison v. Ison, 5 Rich. Eq. (S.C.) 15
(1852); M'Caw v. Blewit, supra note 334.
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The distinction in the cases is that one was given for the mere gratification of the child, whereas the other was given for the purpose of
establishing the child in life.
In determining whether a small gift should be charged as an advancement the wealth of the parent must also be considered. The
gift of a horse or a cow by an opulent person is not as persuasive evidence of an advancement as if he were poor.336
In South Carolina and Kentucky, where the intent of the advancor
is immaterial, a gift of small or trifling value is not considered an
advancement. 337

D. When a Parent Sells Property to a Child
A child may approach his father and ask him to sell certain property to him. If the parties agree on a price that is fair and adequate
and the amount agreed on is actually paid, the transaction is a sale.
Therefore, on the parent's death intestate, the value of the property
cannot be charged to the child as an advancement.338 Many times
the problem is not that easy to solve. For instance, the agreed price
may be less than the actual value of the property or the deed may recite
consideration that has not, in fact, been paid. In both of these situations, if the parent dies intestate, the doctrine of advancements plays
a very important role.

I. When the Consideration Paid Is Not Equal to the Value of
the Property Conveyed. Often a parent conveys real estate to a child
for love and affection and a nominal consideration, i.e., one to twentyfive dollars. Under such circumstances, courts are not warranted in
finding that the transfer was a sale and accordingly the presumption
is one of advancement.339
If a parent conveys property worth $5000 to a child for a consideration of $?000, should the difference in value be charged to the
child as an advancement? The vast majority of cases hold that it
should be charged as such because to hold otherwise would defeat the
336 McDonald v. McDonald, supra note 333; M'Caw v. Blewit,
337 Griggs v. Lane, supra note 332.
338 Holland v. Bonner, 142 Ark. 214, 218 S.W. 665 (1920);

supra note 334.

Stauffer v. Martin, 43
Ind. App. 675, 88 N.E. 363 (1909); Ex parte Barefoot, 201 N.C. 393, 160 S.E. 365
(1931); Nobles v. Davenport, 183 N.C. 207, 111 S.E. 180 (1922); Kiger v. Terry, 119
N.C. 456, 26 S.E. 38 (1896); Osborne v. Richmond, 131 Va. 261, 108 S.E. 560 (1921);
Edwards v. Freeman, 2 P. Wms. 436, 24 Eng. Rep. 803 (1727). In that case the court
said at 808: "... if the child had been a purchaser, or creditor of the father, it could not
be intended, that what was the child's purchase or debt should be brought into hotchpot."
339 Parks v. Parks, 19 Md. 323 (1863). In that case the consideration was love and
affection and $25. See Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N.C. 654, 50 S.E. (2d) 901 (1948).
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very equality in the distribution of a parent's estate among his children
that the statute is designed to protect.840 However, where the consideration paid is nearly equal in value to the property conveyed, the
courts hold the transaction to be a sale.841
In Tennessee, the court holds that a sale by a father to a son is not
an advancement in part merely because the consideration is inadequate. 842 The reason for those decisions is that a court will not weigh
in "golden scales" the dealings between parent and child or declare
what both parties intended as a sale to be an advancement upon proof
merely of inadequacy of consideration.848

2. When a Deed Recites a Consideration That Has Not Been
Paid. Often a parent, in deeding property to a child, instructs the
person drawing the deed to insert a specified sum as the consideration
paid. The parties do not intend for the sum to be paid and it is not
paid. On the parent's death intestate, the other children, seeking to
show advancements, may have to prove that the recited consideration
was not paid. If the deed is in consideration of love and affection and
a nominal consideration, no difficulty is presented, the presumption
being one of advancement.844 However, if the consideration recited
is substantial, the child receiving the property will claim that to permit
a showing that it was not in fact paid is violative of the parol evidence
rule.
In all states but Vermont,845 the courts hold that to permit a showing that the consideration was not paid for the purpose of proving an
840 Mossestad v. Gunderson, 140 Iowa 290, 118 N.W. 374 (i908); Gossage v.
Gossage's Admr., 281 Ky. 575, 136 S.W. (2d) 775 (1940); Powell's Heirs v. Powell's
Heirs, 35 Ky. (5 Dana) 168 (1837); Stewart v. State, 2 Har. and G. (Md.) 114 (1828).
In that case the court pointed out that there is no presumption that the price paid for the
property was inadequate. Mumford v. Mumford, (Mo. App. 1917) 194 S.W. 898; Ex
parte Barefoot, 201 N.C. 393, 160 S.E. 365 (1931); In re O'Hara's Estate, 204 Iowa 1331,
217 N.W. 245 (1928). In that case the consideration for the conveyance was $12,000 and
the child's agreement to support his father for life. The father died very shortly thereafter.
Held, that the transaction was a sale.
841 Kiger v. Terry, 119 N.C. 456, 26 S.E. 38 (1896).
342 Merriman Admr. v. Lacefield, 51 Tenn. (4 Heisk.) 209 (1871).
348 Ibid.
344 Hatch v. Straight, 3 Conn. 31 (1819); Parks v. Parks, 19 Md. 323 (1863); Scott
v. Scott, 1 Mass. 527 (1805); Ex parte Griffin, 142 N.C. 116, 54 S.E. 1007 (1906);
Sayles v. Baker, 5 R.I. 457 (1858). In that case the court held that a conveyance for love
and affection was conclusively an advancement. The court pointed out that if the recited
consideration is love and affection and a nominal sum the presumption is one of advancement.
345 Adams v. Adams, 22 Vt. 50 (1849). Also in accord with this case is the Missouri
case of Yates v. Burt, 161 Mo. App. 267, 143 S.W. 73 (1912). That case was overruled
by implication in the following Missouri cases: Pilkington v. Wheat, 330 Mo. 767, 51
S.W. (2d) 610 (1916); Gobel v. Kitchen, 217 Mo. App. 354, 266 S.W. 992 (1924);
Lynch v. Culver, 260 Mo. 495, 168 S.W. 1138 (1914).
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advancement does not violate the parol evidence rule. 346 The reason
for such holdings is that the heirs seeking to charge the transfer as an
advancement are not seeking to impeach or defeat the title transferred
by the conveyance, but merely to prove that an advancement was intended.
The recital of consideration places the burden of proving that an
advancement was intended on the party alleging such to be the case.350
If the grantee in the deed admits that the consideration was not paid,
the presumption is one of advancement.351
Earlier in this monograph we saw that in some states a transfer of
property cannot be charged as an advancement unless evidenced by a
writing. In those jurisdictions, proof that the consideration was not
paid does not aid the party claiming advancement because there is no
writing charging the transfer as such.352

E. When a Parent Purchases Property in the Name of a Child
When a person pays the purchase money for real property, but
takes title in the name of a stranger, the courts hold that the party
taking the legal title holds it in trust for the one who paid the purchase
price.353 However, where a parent purchases real estate and takes
title in the name of a child, the transaction is presumed to be an advancement or gift rather than a resulting trust. 354 The basis of the
rule is that the parent makes the conveyance in consideration of some
legal or moral obligation to his family. 355
Most cases on this point do not involve the doctrine of advancements. In these cases a parent purchased the property in a child's
name and, after a dispute with the latter, sought to recover the prop346 Meeker v. Meeker, 16 Conn. 383 (1844); Finch v. Garrett, 102 Iowa 381, 71
N.W. 429 (1897); Burton v. Baldwin, 61 Iowa 283, 16 N.W. 110 (1883); McCray v.
Com, 168 Ky. 457, 182 S.W. 640 (1916); Crafton v. Inge, 124 Ky. 89, 98 S.W. 325
(1906); Gordon's Heirs v. Gordon, 58 Ky. (I Mete.) 285 (1858); Parks v. Parks, 19 Md.
323 (1863); Pilkington v. Wheat, supra note 345; Gobel v. Kitchen, supra note 345;
Lynch v. Culver, supra note 345; Speer v. Speer, 14 N.J. Eq. 240 (1862); Bruce v.
Slemp, 82 Va. 352, 4 S.E. 692 (1886).
347-340 omitted.-Ed.
350 Day v. Grubbs, 235 Ky. 741, 32 S.W. (2d) 327 (1930); Pilkington v. Wheat,
supra note 345.
351 Lynch v. Culver, supra note 345; Gobel v. Kitchen, supra note 345.
352 Supra pp. 244-248.
353 McCafferty v. Flinn, 14 Del. Ch. 307, 125 A. 675 (1924); Hall v. Hall, 107 Mo.
101, 17 s.w. 811 (1891).
354Bogy v. Roberts, 48 Ark. 17, 2 S.W. 186 (1886); Robinson v. Robinson, 45 Ark.
481 (1885); Brown v. Burke, 22 Ga. 574 (1857); Hall v. Hall, supra note 353; Page v.
Page, 8 N.H. 187 (1836); Mott v. Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq. 185, 181 A. 689 (1935); Landrum v.
Landrum, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 130 S.W. 907 (1910).
855 McCafferty v. Flinn, supra note 353; Hall v. Hall, supra note 353.
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erty on the theory that a resulting trust was intended.356 The courts
are very reluctant to permit a parent to recover in such a case. For
that reason they hold that a resulting trust must be established by
strong, unequivocal and convincing evidence.357
These cases are of some value in determining whether the purchase
of property in the name of a child is an advancement. If the parent
cannot recover the property and later dies intestate, the courts are called
upon to determine whether the transaction is an advancement or gift.
Under such circumstances they hold that. the presumption is one of
advancement.358
The property purchased in the child's riame may constitute a large
portion of the parent's estate. For that reason, other heirs will claim
that the transfer was a resulting trust. In the jurisdictions that have
been called upon to pass on this problem, the courts hold that the
presumption is one of advancement.359
356 Stacy v. Stacy, 175 Ark. 763, 300 S.W. 437 (1927); Bogy v. Roberts, supra note
354; Cotton v. Citizen's Bank, 97 Ark. 568, 135 S.W. 340 (1911); Robinson v. Robinson,
supra note 354; Faylor v. Faylor, 136 Cal. 92, 68 P. 482 (1902); McCafferty v. Flinn,
supra note 353; Mott v. Iossa, supra note 354; Hall v. Hall, supra note 353; Page v. Page,
supra note 354; Creed v. Lancaster Bank, 1 Ohio St. 1 (1852); Dudley v. Bos.vorth, 29
Tenn. (10 Humph.) 9 (1848); Thompson's Heirs v. Thompson's Devisees, 9 Tenn. (1
Yerg.) 97 (1826); Hamilton v. Bradley, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 127 (1818).
357Bogy v. Roberts, 48 Ark. 17, 2 S.W. 186 (1886); Brown v. Burke, 22 Ga. 574
(1857); Brennaman v. Schell, 212 lli. 356, 72 N.E. 412 (1904); Bay v. Cook, 31 lli. 336
(1863). In that case a creditor claimed that a transfer by a parent to a son was a resulting
trust. The court found that the conveyance was made to avoid a prospective liability and
held that a resulting trust was created. Taylor v. Taylor, 9 lli. (4 Gilman) 303 (1847);
Culp v. Price, 107 Iowa 133, 77 N.W. 848 (1899); Hunnell v. Zinn, (Mo. Supp. 1916)
184 S.W. 1154. In that case the court held that the fact that the parent received part
of the rents and was consulted as to the making of improvements was not sufficient to rebut
the presumption of advancement. Jackson v. Matsdorf, 11 Johns. (N.Y.) 91 (1814);
Catoe v. Catoe, 32 S.C. 595, 10 S.E. 1078 (1890); Dudley v. Bosworth, 29 Tenn. (10
Humph.) 9 (1848). Cases holding that the evidence was insufficient to rebut the presumption of advancement: Bogy v. Roberts, supra this note. In that case a parent purchased
property in the name of a child. The parent took possession, made improvements and
received the rents and profits. Held, that this evidence was not sufficient to rebut the
presumption of advancement. Eastham v. Powell, 51 Ark. 530, 11 S.W. 823 (1889);
McCafferty v. Flinn, 14 Del. Ch. 307, 125 A. 675 (1924); Mott v. Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq.
185, 181 A. 689 (1935). In that case a stepfather purchased real estate in the name of
a stepson. Subsequently, he discovered that his marriage to the child's mother was void.
Held, that this evidence was insufficient to show that a resulting trust was intended.
Astreen v. Flanagan, 3 Ed. Ch. (N.Y.) 279 (1839).
358Taylor v. Taylor, 9 lli. (4 Gilman) 303 (1847); Scott v. Harris, 127 Ind. 520, 27
N.E. 150 (1891); Barth v. Severson, 191 Iowa 770, 183 N.W. 617 (1921); Ellis v.
Newell, 120 Iowa 71, 94 N.W. 463 (1910); Hunnell v. Zinn, (Mo. Supp. 1916) 184
s.w. 1154.
359 Barth v. Severson, supra note 358; Hunnell v. Zinn, supra note 358.
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F. When a Child Purchases Property In His Name with His Parent's
Money

Suppose a parent gives a child money to purchase real estate with
the understanding that title is to be taken in the parent's name. If
the child, in violation of this agreement, takes title to the property in
his own name, the other heirs, on the parent's death, may claim the
transaction was a resulting trust rather than an advancement. The
only cases involving this problem are not advancement cases. In those
cases the parent discovered what had taken place and sued the child
to establish a resulting trust. In these cases, the court held that the
child holds the property as trustee for his father. 360 If the parent discovers that the child has purchased the property in his own name and
if he does not object, the courts hold that he intended to make a gift
to the child and on his death intestate, the value of the property is
deemed an advancement to the child. 361 If the parent did not discover
the facts prior to his death, the courts would undoubtedly hold that
the property was held by the child as trustee for his parent.

G. When a Parent Pays a Note He Has Signed as Surety for a Child
Many times an adult person borrows money and in doing so he
is required to have a surety on his note. If a parent is :financially
acceptable he often signs as surety and, on his son's default, is compelled to pay the debt. If he dies intestate and does not collect the
money so paid, the other cl}ildren may seek to charge the amount he
paid to discharge his suretyship obligation as an advancement. At
the same time, the child receiving the money may want it treated as
a debt because the indebtedness is barred by limitations. The authorities are divided. Some courts treat the transaction as one where the
father has voluntarily paid the debt of the son and presume that it
is an advancement.362 Other courts have recognized the fallacy of this
360 Moore v. Scruggs, 131 Iowa 692, 109 N.W. 205 (1906); Peer v. Peer, 11 N.J.
Eq. (3 Stockton) 432 (1857).
361 Douglass v. Brice, 4 Rich Eq. (S.C.) 322 (1852); Gregory v. Winston's Admr.,
23 Grat. (Va.) 102 (1873).
362Wood v. Knotts, 196 Iowa 544, 194 N.W. 953 (1923); Reynolds Admrs. v.
Reynolds, 92 Ky. 556, 18 S.W. 517 (1892); Haglar v. McCombs, 66 N.C. 345 (1872);
Huffman v. Ramey, 157 Tenn. 183, 15 S.W. (2d) 746 (1928); Steele Admr. v. Friarson,
85 Tenn. 430, 3 S.W. 649 (1887); Johnson v. Hoyle, 40 Tenn. 56 (1859).
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line of reasoning and hold that it is a debt. 363 The theory of these
decisions is that the parent, in his lifetime, did not give up the right to
sue the child for indemnity and that the debt, therefore, never became
an advancement.364 If the father, at the time of payment, indicates
that he intends to treat the transaction as an advancement, the courts
respect that desire. 365 But if he attempts to change the transaction
from a debt to an advancement at a later date in order to prevent his
claim from being barred by limitations, the courts refuse to follow his
intention unless he expressed that desire in the presence of the child
and the latter did not object to the change. 366
The cases adhering to the view that if a father as surety pays a debt
of a son, the transaction is an advancement, are, in the opinion of the
writer, unsound. It is obvious that the requirement of a gift is not
present since the father could sue the son at once on the theory of
indemnity. Until he relinquishes that right, the transaction should
be treated as a debt.

H. When a Parent Takes a Note or Security for NI.oney Paid a Child
A child may ask his parent for a substantial sum of money and
give him a note or mortgage or both. On the parent's death intestate,
the other heirs, if the note or mortgage is barred by limitations, will
claim that the transaction is an advancement. The child, in order to
save interest, may claim that it was a part portion or he may, if the
parent died testate, claim that an advancement was intended. The
courts hold that the presumption is one of debt. 367 In the event of
litigation, one of the parties always contends that parol evidence is not ·
admissible to prove that the transaction was an advancement.368 However, the rule is well settled that parol evidence is admissible to prove
363 In re Hutman's Estate, 30 Pittsbg. (Pa.). Leg. J. 385 (1883); In re Buchanan's
Estate, 2 Chest. Co. (Pa.) Rep. 74 (1883); Levering v. Rittenhouse, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 130
(1839).
364 Note 360 supra.
365 Treadwell v. Everett, 185 Ga. 454, 195 S.E. 762 (1938); In re Buchanan's
Estate, supra note 363; McDearman v. Hodnett, 83 Va. 281, 2 S.E. 643 (1887). Cf.
Wood v. Knotts, 196 Iowa 544, 194 N.W. 953 (1923).
366 Note 363 supra.
367 Haines v. Christie, 28 Colo. 502, 66 P. 883 (1901); Barron v. Barron, 181 Ga.
505, 182 S.E. 851 (1935); Russell v. Smith, 115 Iowa 261, 88 N.W. 361 (1901); Guarantee Title and Trust Co. v. Siedhoff, 144 Kan. 13, 58 P. (2d) 66 (1936); Bowman's
Admrs. v. Bowman's Exr., 301 Ky. 694, 192 S.W. (2d) 955 (1946); Sprague v. Moore,
130 Mich. 92, 89 N.W. 712 (1902); Overholser v. Wright, 17 Ohio St. 157 '(1866); In
re Morris' Estate, 356 Pa. 497, 52 A. (2d) 172 (1947); In re Jones' Estate, 29 Pittsb. (Pa.)
Leg. Jr. 89 (1881); High's Appeal, 21 Pa. (9 Harris) 283 (1853); House v. Woodard,
45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 196 (1867); Vaden Admr. v. Hance, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 300 (1858).
368 Grey's Heirs v. Grey's Admrs., 22 Ala. 233 (1853); Cutliff v. Boyd, 72 Ga. 302
(1884); Sadler v. Huffhines, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 670, 12 S.W. 715 (1889).

1953]

ADVANCEMENTS

261

that an advancement was intended.369 Before the court will hold that
an ,advancement was intended, the evidence must be clear and convincing.310
In jurisdictions which require all advancements to be evidenced
by a charge in writing, parol evidence is not admissible to show that
a note or mortgage is an advancement. 371

I. When a Parent Refers to the Transaction as a Gi~
A parent may give property to a child and refer to it as a gift. In
Rowe 11. Rowe, 372 a son stated that his parent, at the time he transferred
property to him, said that it was given '\.vithout strings tied to it" and
the gift was made to relieve the father of taxes as he wanted the son
"to enjoy the property in his lifetime." The son claimed that the
father's declarations were sufficient to rebut the presumption of advancement. The court held that the language was as consistent with
an advancement as with a gift and that therefore the language was not
sufficient to rebut the presumption of advancement. All other cases
are in accord with that decision.373
A child may accept a gift when he would refuse an advancement.
If the parent refers to the transaction as a gift he probably intended it
as such. If he intended an advancement he would have used appropriate language. People who are not trained in law do not know the
technical legal meaning of these words. To charge them with the
legal meaning of the words might run counter to their intention. Although, from a technical point of view, the decisions of the courts may
be correct, logical public policy dictates that the rule should be different.
To a layman a gift is not an advancement and an advancement is not
a gift. Therefore, if the parent calls the transaction a gift and the
child accepts it as such, he should not be charged with an advancement.
309 Buscher v. Knapp, 107 Ind. 340, 8 N.E. 263 (1886); Stovall v. Stovall's Admr.,
14 Ky. L. Rep. 668 (1893); Comer v. Grazens, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 668 (1893). Cf. Porter
v. Porter, 51 Me. 376 (1862).
370 Fennell v. Henry, 70 Ala. 484 (1881); Hindshaw v. Security Trust Co., 48 Ind.
App. 351, 93 N.E. 567 (1911); Willetts v. Willetts, 19 Ind. 22 (1862); Harley v. Harley,
57 Md. 340 (1882); Sadler v. Huffhines, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 670, 12 S.W. 715 (1889);
Doty v. Doty, 155 Pa. St. 285, 26 A. 548 (1893); Merkel's Appeal, 89 Pa. 340 (1879);
Jennings v. Jennings, 49 Tenn. (2 Heisk.) 283 (1871).
371 Meppen v. Meppen, 392 ill. 30, 63 N.E. (2d) 755 (1946); Porter v. Porter, 51
Me. 376 (1862); Lodge v. Fitch, 72 Neb. 652, 101 N.W. 338 (1904); Schmidt v.
Schmidt's Estate, 123 Wis. 295, 101 N.W. 678 (1904).
372 144 Va. 816, 130 S.E. 771 (1925).
373 In re Sell's Estate, 197 Iowa 696, 197 N.W. 922 (1924); Lynch v. Culver, 260
Mo. 495, 168 S.W. 1138 (1914); Dutch's Appeal, 57 Pa. (7 P. F. Smith) 461 (1868).
See Laman v. Craig, 30 Tenn. App. 353, 206 S.W. (2d) 309 (1947).
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When a Father-in-Law Transfers Property to a Son-in-Law

A father-in-law may give money to, or pay bills owed by, a son-inlaw. On his death, the question may arise as to whether amounts so
paid should be charged as advancements to his daughter. Three possibilities must be considered in solving this problem: (I) the advancor
tells his son-in-law that the gift is intended as an advancement in his
daughter's presence; (2) the father-in-law states it is an advancement
and his daughter is not present; and (3) at the time of the transaction
nothing is said about it being charged as an advancement.
The £.rst possibility presents no difficulty since the transaction took
place in the daughter's presence. She is deemed to have consented to
having it charged to her as an advancement. 374 The second and third
possibilities, however, present a more complicated problem. Prior to the
enactment of the married women's act, the courts held that a gift of
personalty was an advancement but a gift of realty was not. 376 The
North Carolina court, in Banks v. Shannonhouse, 376 expressed the
reasons for the rule in the following quotation:
"In our opinion there is a very essential difference. If personal
property be given to a wife, it instantly, jure mariti, belongs to
the husband; so it is immaterial whether the gift be made to the
wife or to the husband. But if land be given to the wife it remains
hers, and the husband can only become entitled to a life estate as
tenant by the curtesy; whereas, if it be conveyed to the husband,
the wife takes nothing, save a collateral right to have dower in case
she survives; so it cannot be said in any sense that she has received
of her father any land by way of advancement."
However, after enactment of the statute permitting married women
to own and dispose of their property, the courts changed the rule and
held that a ·voluntary inter vivos transfer of property, whether it is real
or personal property or both, by a father-in-law to a son-in-law is an
advancement to the daughter even though she was not present at the
time of the transaction and the father-in-law did not state it was an
advancement. 377
374Dicta, Rains v. Hays, 74 Tenn. (6 Lea) 303 (1880).
375 Hagler v. McCombs, 66 N.C. 345 (1872); Banks v. Shannonhouse, 61 N.C. 284
(1867); Dixon v. Coward, 57 N.C. (4 Jones Eq.) 354 (1859); Harrington Admr. v.
Moore, 48 N.C. (3 Jones L.) 56 (1855). Cf. Hinton v. Hinton, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. and
B. Eq.) 587 (1837).
376 671 N.C. 284 at 287 (1867).
377 Rumbly v. Stainton, 24 Ala. 712 (1854); Burnett v. Branch Bank of Mobile, 22
Ala. 642 (1853); Wilson's Heirs v. Wilson's Admr., 18 Ala. 176 (1850); James v. James,
41 Ark. 301 (1883); Lindsay v. Platt, 9 Fla. 150 (1860); Ireland v. Dyer, 133 Ga. 851,
67 S.E. 195 (1910); Dilley v. Love, 61 Md. 603 (1883); McDearman v. Hodnett, 83
Va. 281, 2 S.E. 643 (1887); Bruce v. Slemp, 82 Va. 352, 4 S.E. 692 (1887).

1953]

ADVANCEMENTS

263

Although the courts changed the law dealing with advancements
by a father-in-law to a son-in-law, they claim that the married women's act had no effect on the law regarding advancements. To demonstrate the fallacy of that rule, quotations from two cases will be noted.
In McDearman v. Hodnett, 378 the Virginia court said:
"The argument is that the act changed the relation of a husband towards his wife as respects her property, which is no longer
subject to his disposal, or to the payment of his debts, but is to be
possessed and controlled by her, as though she were a feme sole.
This may be true, but we do not perceive that it affects the question before us. The object of the act is to secure to married women
the enjoyment and control of their property, but not to interfere
with the dominion over and right of disposal of one's property, or
with the general law as respects the dealings between parents and
their children, or the distribution of decedent's estates. The question of advancements ... is not touched or in any way inHuenced
by the act; nor was it designed to have any such inHuence."
In Ireland v. Dyer,379 the Georgia court said:
"It is well settled by the authorities that the donor's intention
is the controlling principle in the application of the doctrine of
advancements, and that whatever the donor intended as an advancement should be so considered without regard to the mode of
making it or of securing the actual enjoyment of it. According to
this principle it has many times been held that a gift to a son-inlaw during the life of the donee's wife constitutes an advancement
to the wife, and it is immaterial that the daughter does not know
of the advancement to the son-in-law, or that by reason of improper
investments or otherwise the daughter does not in fact derive any
benefit from the advancement. Thus the payment by the father of
his son-in-law's debts may constitute an advancement to the
daughter. . . . It has been held that the married women's property
act securing to them their separate property did not prevent an
advancement to the son-in-law from being deemed an advancement to the daughter."
The quotation from McDearman v. Hodnett is based on the
assumption that the married women's act was not intended to change
the law regarding advancements. That assumption is undoubtedly
correct. However, the act destroyed the reason back of the rule. As
shown previously, prior to the enactment of the married women's act,
the courts held that a transfer of personal property by a father-in-law
83 Va. 281 at 285, 2 S.E. 643 (1887).
133 Ga. 851 at 854, 67 S.E. 195 (1910), quoting from 2 AM. &: Erm. ENc. LAw
326-327.
378
879
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to a son-in-law was an advancement to the daughter but that a transfer
of real property was not. 380 The reason for the rule was that the husband had control over the personal estate of his wife.381 When the
married women's act was adopted that reason was destroyed. Consequently, the courts should now hold that a transfer of property from a
father-in-law to a son-in-law is not an advancement unless consented
to by the daughter.
The quotation from Ireland v. Dyer is based on the assumption
that the intent of the intestate determines the parties to whom the
concept of advancements applies. However, that assumption is incorrect. The intention of the intestate is material only in determining
whether a voluntary inter vivos transfer is an advancement or a gift. It
cannot be used to give an intestate the power to extend the doctrine to
parties not included in the statute. If the statement from Ireland v.
Dyer is carried to its logical conclusion, a parent could make a gift to
anyone he desires and charge it to one of his children as an advancement. Such a rule would defeat the very equality that the doctrine is
intended to preserve.
The cases decided subsequent to the married women's act rely on
the Florida case of Lindsay v. Platt3 82 as authority for the proposition
that a voluntary inter vivos transfer from a father-in-law to a son-in-law
is an advancement to his daughter. In that case the transfer was made
prior to the enactment of the married women's act, but the act was
passed prior to the intestate's death. The gift was of personal property.
Therefore the court was warranted in holding that the transaction was
an advancement. However, that case is not authority for the proposition that a voluntary inter vivos transfer of real or personal property by
a father-in-law to a son-in-law subsequent to the married women's act
is an advancement to the daughter.
A gift from a father-in-law to a daughter-in-law should be charged
as an advancement if a gift from a father-in-law to a son-in-law is one.
However, the courts hold that a transfer to a daughter-in-law is not an
advancement unless the son consents ta the transaction. 383
[To be concluded.]
380Wilson's Heirs v. Wilson's Admr., 18 Ala. 176 (1850); Wentz v. DeHaven, 1 S.
and R. (Pa.) 312 (1815).
381 Cf. Burnett v. Branch Bank of Mobile, 22 Ala. 642 (1853); Rumbly v. Stainton,
24 Ala. 712 (1854).
3s2 9 Fla. 150 (1860).
383 Zerega v. Zerega, 78 Misc. 466, 138 N.Y.S. 580 (1912). Cf. Palmer v. Culbertson, 65 Hun 625, 20 N.Y.S. 391 (1892), affd. 143 N.Y. 213, 38 N.E. 199 (1894).

